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CURRENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCESS-ALIENs-DEPORTATION WITHOUT A HEAR-
ING.-By the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 the Secretary of State for Home
Affairs was empowered to order the deportation of aliens if he should deem
it to be conducive to the public good. The S~cretary made such an order
respecting one Venicoff, acting on a report of the Criminal Investigation Depart-
ment that he was living on the immoral earnings of women. Venicoff obtained
rules nisi for habeas corpus and certiorari. Held, that the rules should be
discharged, because the Secretary was not bound to hear the party against whom
the order was made, as he was not acting as a judicial tribunal but as an execu-
tive officer. Rex v. The Home Secretary; Ex Parte Venicoff [I92o 3 K. B. 72.
The contrary result would be reached in the United States because of the due
process clause of the Constitution, which, of course, applies to .proceedings for the
deportation of aliens by the Department of Labor. Due process includes the right
to be heard. But the courts, in reviewing such a proceeding, will sustain the action
of the Secretary of Labor unless the proceeding was unfair, or unless there was no
evidence to support the findings of fact, or unless the findings are insufficient
in law to warrant deportation. Gegiow v. Uhl (1915) 239 U. S. 3, 36 Sup. Ct. 2;
Ex .Parte Mitchell (1919, N. D. N. Y.) 256 Fed. 229; Colyer v. Skeffington.
(1920, D. Mass.) 265 Fed. 17.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS-PAYMENT OF FINE TO PRIVATE CORPORA-
TION-The plaintiff owned two dogs which she kept in New York City without
having obtained a license. She was found guilty and required to pay a fine.
The act providing for the license impowered the American Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals to enforce its provisions and to collect the
fees for issuing such licenses and use them to carry out the Act and to maintain
a shelter for lost and homeless animals. The plaintiff contested the act as
unconstitutional. Held, that the act was valid. Nicchia v. People (i92o, U. S.)
41 Sup. Ct. 103.
Dogs are placed in a class with monkeys, cats, parrots, canaries and other
similar animals which man keeps to please his fancy. This class stands midway
between ferae naturae in which there is no property and domestic animals in
which the right of property is complete. Sentell v. N. 0. & C. R. R. (1897)
i66 U. S. 698, i7 Sup. Ct. 693; see note, 40 L. R. A. 5o3. They are proper
subjects for the exercise of the police power. 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations
(5th ed. 1911) sec. 724- The instant case raised the question of whether the
payment of the fees to a private corporation was valid. For a discussion of this
point see Fox .v. Mohawk an& H. R. Humane Society (Igoi) I6 5 N. Y. 517,
522, 59 N. E. 353, 354; People ex rel. State Board of Charities v. New York
S. P. C. C. (igoo) I6 N. Y. 233, 239, 250, 55 N. E. lo63.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-No PowER IN STATE TO INTERFERE WITH THE EXECUTION
oF A FEDERAL DuTy.-An employee of the Post Office Department of the United
States while driving a government motor truck over a post road in the transpor-
tation of mail to Washington was arrested, tried, convicted, and fined for so
driving without having obtained a license from the state. Held, that the convic-
tion should be reversed. Johnson v. Maryland (1920, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct. I6.
The court said that the state has no power to require such an employee to
obtain a license by submitting to an examination concerning his competence and
paying three dollars before performing his official duty in obedience to superior
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command. If the employee acts under and within his federal authority, the
state has no power to interfere. See Ohio V. Thomas (1899) 173 U. S. 276,
284, 19 Sup. Ct. 453, 455; see COMMENTS (ig8) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 6r.
But a state has the power to prescribe regulations for one engaged in interstate
commerce. Smith v. Alabama (1888) 124 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 564. As to who
is an officer of the United States so as to be free from interference by the
state, see Ann. Cas. 1914 B, io5, note.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-POLICE POWER-STATUTE IMPOSING LIABILITY UPON
AUTOMOBILE OWNER FOR NEGLIGENCE OF HIS ImMEDIATz FAmY..-The defen-
dant's son negligently operated the defendant's automobile and injured the
plaintiff. A statute provided that if the motor vehicle was being driven by an
immediate member of the owner's family, it should be conclusively presumed
that it was with the owner's consent and knowledge. The defendant offered
evidence that his son took and was driving the automobile against his express
wishes. Held, (by a divided court) that such evidence was inadmissible. Hawk-
ins v. Eomatinger (192o, Mich.) 179 N. W. 249.
The court was divided on the question whether this statute was a reasonable
exercise of the police power of the legislature. For a discussion of the owner's
liability in the absence of statute, see (Ig2o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 467; (1920)
2o COL. L. REV. 213,.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REPEAL OF TAX EXEMPTION NOT AN IMPAIRMENT OF
OBLIGATION OF CONTLCT.-The defendant and city of Troy, in 1852, agreed
on a plan to construct a terminal, by which agreement, among other things,
the city covenanted to join in an application to the legislature of New York
that the defendant should be exempt from taxation upon an amount exceeding
its capital stock, which was $3oooo. In 1853, the desired act was passed. In
1858, a new agreement with practically the same provisions was made, to replace
that of 1852. In 1gog, the act of 1853 was repealed and the assessors of Troy
assessed the defendant for $783,984. The defendant claimed that the act of
I909 violated the contract clause of the federal Constitution. Held, that the act
was constitutional. People ex rel. Troy Union Ry. v. Mealy (i92O, U. S.)
41 Sup. Ct. 17.
This decision illustrates the adverse attitude of the courts toward claims of
exemptions from taxation. As to the power of a municipality to exempt property
from taxation see Tarver v. City of Dalton (191o) 134 Ga. 462, 67 S. E. 929, 29
L. R. A. (N. S.) 183, note. For a discussion of the repeal of exemption laws
and absence of consideration for same, see Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. v. Powers
(193o) 191 U. S. 379, 385, 24 Sup. Ct. 107, 1O8. See also (1921) 5 IOWA L.
BULL. 265.
CONTRACrs-MUTUALITY-INTRPRETATION OF "REQUIREMENT CONTRACT."--The
plaintiff sued for the breach of a written contract whereby the defendant was to
sell to him the entire supply of newspaper necessary for his business for one
year, estimated at a certain tonnage. The plaintiff resold part of the paper
at a profit instead of using it in his business. The question was whether this
contract only included the amount of paper actually used in the business, or
whether the plaintiff had the privilege of ordering the amount of the estimated
tonnage. Held, (Ward, J., dissenting) that the defendant was under a duty
to deliver only as much paper as the plaintiff used in his business. National
Publishing Co. 20. International Paper Co. (Nov. 12, i92o) U. S. C. C. A. 2d
Oct. Term ig2o, No. ii.
It has been held that the quantity contracted for must be reasonably certain
or capable of being approximately ascertained. See (1921) 30 YALM LAW
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JouRNAi, 297. The insertion of the estimated tonnage in the instant case serves,
therefore, only to make the terms of the contract more certain. The lack of
mutuality is also negatived by the fact that the plaintiff is under a duty to or~Ier
the amount actually required in his business. Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim Sugar
Co. (I918, C. C. A. 9th) 247 Fed. 958. Hence, the interpretation of the intention
of the parties seems sound. See Lima Locomotive & Machine Co. v. Nat'l
Steel Castings Co. (i9o7, C. C. A. 6th) 155 Fed. 77.
CRIMINAL LAw-SUIcLDE-"ADMINISTERIN" PoisoN TO ANOTHER-The wife of
the accused was incurably ill and had tried to end her suffering by drinking
poison. Having once failed,. she requested her husband to mix Paris Green
and water in a cup and place it within her reach. He did so, but in no other
way encouraged her purpose. A statute made "murder by means of poison,"
murder in the first degree. Held, that accused was guilty of murder in the first
degree. People v. Roberts (I92O, Mich.) 178 N. W. 69o.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 4o8.
INSURANCE-SUIcmE OF INSURED NOT AN IMPLIED ExcEPrD RisK.-One John-
son, who was insured by the defendant companies, committed suicide, while
sane, more than two years after the policies were issued. One policy, payable
to his wife, contained a provision that it should be void if the insured should
die by his own hand within two years. The other policy, payable to his adminis-
trator, contained a provision that it should be incontestable after one year,
except for non-payment of premiums. Held, that the companies were liable on
the policies. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson and National Life
Ins. Co. v. Miller (1920, U. S.), 41 Sup. Ct 47.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 4oi.
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF WHOLESOMENESS-STOCK SOLD FOR FooD.-The
plaintiffs purchased 22 'hogs from the defendant, a stock dealer. Within thirty-
six hours thereafter the hogs became sick and commenced dying from cholera.
The plaintiffs brought an action to recover the purchase price. An instruction
was given that, if the defendant sold these hogs to the plaintiffs knowing that they
intended to use them for food, then the defendant impliedly warranted them to
be fit for that purpose. Held, that the instruction was erroneous, as this was
a case of caveat emptor. Wells v. Welch (i92o, Mo. App.) 224 S. W. i2o.
The instruction held to be erroneous suggests what would seem to be the
better rule. It is impossible to justify on any grounds such a rigid application of
the doctrine of caveat emptor. See (192o) 6 VA. L. REG. (N. S.) 389. The
doctrine has been recently so restricted as to be almost abrogated. Foote v.
Wilson (1919) 1O4 Kan. 191, 178 Pac. 43o. For a thorough analysis of the
subject see COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 782.
TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAx-GAINS REALIZED ON SALE OF SEcuRITIES
NOT INcoME-The plaintiff paid under protest a federal income tax for the
year 1916, assessed on the basis of gain derived from the sale of bonds. The
bonds had been purchased before March i, 1913, and on that date their market
value was much lower than the purchase price. In 1916 they were sold by the
plaintiff, certain of them at their original cost to him, others at a slight advance
over cost price, but all at a great advance over their market value on March 1,
1913. In each case the difference between the sale price and the market value
on that date was taxed as income. The plaintiff was not engaged as a trader
in stocks or bonds, but had purchased the bonds for investment. He brought
suit to recover the tax. Held, that the tax Iwas illegally imposed and that the
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plaintiff was entitled to judgment. Brewster v. Walsh, Collector (Dec. 16, 1920,
U. S. D. C., D. Conn.) No. 2133 (not yet officially reported).
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 396.
TAXATIoN-STATE ENTERPRISES AS LEGITImATE PulosE.-The legislature of
North Dakota created a state bank, an industrial commission with unprecedented
powers, and a home building association; it issued bonds to furnish capital for
the bank, and provided for state manufacturing, marketing, and operation of
grain elevators and flour mills, declaring that the state would furnish homes to
its residents and that bonds would issue to replace the funds its bank might
employ in making loans on private real estate. Taxpayers sought to enjoin the
enforcement of this legislation. Held, that when the people, the legislature,
and the highest court of a state declare a purpose of public nature, the Supreme
Court will not interfere unless beyond reasonable controversy the federal Consti-
tution has been violated. Green v. Frazier (192o, U. S.) 40 Sup. Ct. 499.
The decision settles the much-questioned constitutionality of the Non-Partisan
League's Legislative program. Except for its extreme application as illustrated
in the instant case, the doctrine has often been tested before. See COMMENTS
(1918) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 824.
WILLS-PERPETUITIES-TRUST OF PERSONAL PROPERTY NoT VIoLATION OF STAT-
um--A testator bequeathed his residuary estate to a trustee to be held as
follows: The income was to be divided among all the testator's children living
at the time of the testator's death. When the youngest child reached the age
of thirty years, the trustee was directed to divide one half of the corpus of the
estate among the same beneficiaries, and when the youngest child reached the
age of forty, the remainder was to be similarly divided. The Minnesota statute
against perpetuities did not specifically exempt personal property. Minn. Gen.
St. 1913, sec. 671o. Held, that the trust was valid even though it suspended the
power of alienation beyond the statutory period, since personal property only
was the subject of the trust. In re Bell's Will (192o, Minn.) 179 N. W. 65o.
The decision is in accord with the rule laid down in an earlier case. Y. M. C. A.
v. Horn (1913) i2o Minn. 4o4, 139 N. W. 8o5. But as has been pointed out,
that decision could be defended only on the ground that the court was justified
in making a strained statutory interpretation in order to validate a bequest to
charity which would otherwise have failed, since charitable trusts are not
permitted in Minnesota. See Thurston, Charitable Gifts and the Minnesota
Statute of Uses and Trusts (1917) i MXNN. L. REV. 226-229. Although the court
recognized the force of the criticism of the former decision, and although there
was not the same justification for it in the instant case, yet it felt itself bound
by it, with the anomalous result of having a private trust of personal property
not affected by the rule against perpetuities.
